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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TENTH AMENDMENT-COMMERCE CLAUSE
-APPLICATION OF ADEA TO STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS-The
Supreme Court of the United States has held that the extension of
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to state and local gov-
ernments was a valid exercise of Congress' powers under the com-
merce clause and was not precluded by virtue of tenth amendment
constraints.
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming, 103 S.
Ct. 1054 (1983).
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA or Act),1 which prohibits an employer from dis-
criminating against an employee or a potential employee on the
basis of age.' In 1974, Congress extended the definition of em-
ployer under the Act to include state and local governments.3 This
case examines the constitutionality of that amendment in light of
external restraints placed upon Congress' commerce clause powers
pursuant to the tenth amendment.4
Bill Crump, a district game supervisor for the Wyoming Game
and Fish Department, was forced to retire at age fifty-five, pursu-
ant to a Wyoming statute. Subsequently, Crump filed a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), al-
l. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 80 Stat. 602 (1967) (current version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
2. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1056-57
(1983). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act excepts those situations "where age is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operations of the
particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
3. 103 S. Ct. at 1057. Congress extended the Act to cover state and local governments
by amending the definition of "employer" under § 11(b) of the Act. Pub. L. No. 93-259, §
28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (1974) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
103 S. Ct. at 1057.
4. 103 S. Ct. at 1060. Prior to the district court's decision in this case, EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981), every federal court that considered the constitution-
ality of the 1974 extension of the ADEA to state and local governments upheld the Act as a
valid exercise of Congress' power under either the commerce clause or the fourteenth
amendment. See 103 S. Ct. at 1059 n.6.
5. 103 S. Ct. at 1059. The Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden
Retirement Act, Wvo. STAT. § 31-3-107 (1977), only allows those employees to continue
working past age 55 who have received the approval of their employer, and allows no one to
continue working past age 65, even with approval. 103 S. Ct. at 1059 n.7.
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leging violation of the ADEA." The EEOC then filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming, on be-
half of Crump and others similarly situated, against the state and
several of its officials seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.7
The defendants moved to dismiss the suit, and the district court
did so, holding that the doctrine of tenth amendment immunity, as
set forth in National League of Cities v. Usery,s had been violated
by Congress' attempt to regulate Wyoming's employment relation-
ship with its game wardens and other law enforcement officials."
Additionally, the district court held that the ADEA could not be
upheld under the fourteenth amendment since there was no ex-
plicit statement by Congress that it was relying on this power.1"
The EEOC filed a direct appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1252. The
United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction 1 and re-
versed the district court's ruling."2
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court," began his discussion
with the history of the 1967 Age Discrimination in Employment
Act,"' and the 1974 amendment which extended the Act to state
governments." Justice Brennan noted that the ADEA was not
challenged in this case on the theory that Congress had exceeded
its powers under the commerce clause," but instead was chal-
lenged on the theory that Congress is precluded from imposing the
6. 103 S. Ct. at 1059. Conciliation efforts between the EEOC and the Game and Fish
Department were not successful. Id.
7. Id. The EEOC also sought back pay and liquidated damages on behalf of Crump
and others similarly situated. Id. at 1060.
8. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
9. 103 S. Ct. at 1060.
10. Id. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
11. 454 U.S. 1140 (1981).
12. 103 S. Ct. at 1057.
13. Id. Justice Brennan's majority opinion was joined by Justices White, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Burger
filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined. Justice
Powell filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice O'Connor joined. Id. at 1054.
14. Id. at 1056-59. Although the Act as passed in 1967 only protected workers between
the ages of 40 and 65, the age limit was raised to 70 in 1978. Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189 (1978) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). 103 S. Ct. at 1058.
15. 103 S. Ct. at 1059. See Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (1974) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
16. 103 S. Ct. at 1060. The source of Congress' commerce clause powers is found in
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, which provides: "The Congress shall have the power ... [t]o




ADEA upon the states by virtue of the tenth amendment,17 which
places an external restraint upon Congress.18
Justice Brennan then discussed several relevant cases, beginning
with National League of Cities, which dealt with the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).' Congress had attempted to extend the
FLSA's wage and hour provisions to state and local governments,
but the Court in National League of Cities held that the federal
government would devour the essentials of state sovereignty if it
were permitted to impose federal regulations on state governments
without restraint.2 0 Justice Brennan observed that the Court in
National League of Cities interpreted the tenth amendment as an
"affirmative limitation on the [congressional power under the com-
merce clause] akin to other commerce power affirmative limita-
tions contained in the Constitution."'I Justice Brennan noted,
however, that the principal which has emerged from National
League of Cities is a functional doctrine which allows the states to
function effectively in certain core state functions, but does not
create a "sacred province of state autonomy."'2
Justice Brennan next discussed Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min-
ing & Reclamation Association,"3 which also concerned the issue of
state immunity to federal regulation of commerce . 4 The Court in
Hodel, he explained, developed a three-pronged test which must be
satisfied for the court to strike down legislation under the princi-
ples of National League of Cities.2' Hodel required that the fed-
eral legislation must regulate the "states as states," must address
matters that are indisputably "attributes of state sovereignty," and
that it must be clear that compliance with the federal law would
directly impair the state's ability "to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions.""' Even if all of
17. Under the tenth amendment, "[tihe powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
18. 103 S. Ct. at 1060.
19. Id. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 1, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (cur-
rent version at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
20. 103 S. Ct. at 1060. The Court in National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at 855, was
quoting from Justice Douglas' dissent in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968) (Doug-
las, J., dissenting).
21. 103 S. Ct. at 1060. See 426 U.S. at 841.
22. 103 S. Ct. at 1060.
23. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
24. 103 S. Ct. at 1060-61.
25. Id.
26. Id. See 452 U.S. at 287-88.
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these requirements are met, Justice Brennan noted, under Hodel,
the nature of the federal interest may still require state submission
to the federal regulation, if the federal interest involved is of a cru-
cial nature.1
7
Justice Brennan then applied these requirements to the present
case.2 8 Justice Brennan found it unnecessary to dwell on the first
two prongs of the Hodel test,2 9 his main concern being instead with
the third requirement.30
Although Justice Brennan conceded that the management of
state parks was a traditional state function, 1 he emphasized that
the doctrine of immunity set forth in National League of Cities
was only meant to insulate the states from those federal regula-
tions which threaten the states' very existence.3 2 Justice Brennan
considered the issue to be one of the degree of the federal intrusion
into the states' ability to structure their integral operations. 3 Jus-
tice Brennan then held that the federal regulation in the present
case is so much less intrusive than was the legislation in National
League of Cities, that the Court need not strike down Congress'
decision to extend the ADEA to the states.3 4
Justice Brennan noted the ADEA does not require that the state
abandon its goals, but merely requires that the state achieve its
goals in a more careful and individualized manner. 35 Justice Bren-
nan determined that if age is found to be a "bona fide occupational
qualification" (BFOQ), 6 for the job of game warden, the ADEA
27. 103 S. Ct. at 1060-61. See 452 U.S. at 288 n.29.
28. 103 S. Ct. at 1061-64.
29. Id. at 1061. The first prong of the test is that the challenged legislation must regu-
late the "states as states." Justice Brennan conceded that this requirement was clearly satis-
fled. Id. He did not find it necessary to determine whether the second prong had also been
met, since he found that the third prong of the test had not been satisfied. Id.
30. Id. at 1062.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Justice Brennan noted that the decision in National League of Cities also cen-
tered on questions of degree. Id. See 426 U.S. at 845.
34. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
35. Id. Justice Brennan pointed out that the state may still dismiss those game war-
dens whom it reasonably finds to be unfit, after they have been individually assessed. Id.
The appellees did not claim any other substantial stake in their retirement policy other than
assuring the physical preparedness of their game wardens. Id. The only other interest which
the appellees claimed was in maintaining the integrity of the pension system. Id. at 1063
n.15.
36. Id. at 1062. Justice Brennan referred to the ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981) which provides that neutral criteria not dependent on age be used "where age
is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business, or where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than
Vol. 22:995
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would not prohibit appellees' conduct.3 7 Justice Brennan also ob-
served that there is no threat of the same far-reaching nature to
the structure of state governance by the application of the ADEA
to the states as would have resulted from the effects of the FLSA
on the states in National League of Cities.8
Justice Brennan then concluded the ADEA would neither have a
direct effect nor work a significant hardship on state finances, un-
like the effect of the FLSA in National League of Cities.9 Justice
Brennan reiterated the test for the financial effect set forth in Na-
tional League of Cities, which, he pointed out, was not an individ-
ualized inquiry, but a legal question which seeks to establish a di-
rect and obvious effect of the federal legislation on the states'
ability to allocate their resources.'0 Justice Brennan concluded that
the ADEA does not have such an effect on state resources. 41 Al-
though he conceded that older workers may get paid more than
younger workers, and older workers may retire with increased ben-
efits, these factors would be balanced by other considerations."2
Justice Brennan also found that the ADEA did not impede the
states in pursuing their broad social and economic policies beyond
the present circumstances of this case." He thus noted the distinc-
age." 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
37. 103 S. Ct. at 1062. Justice Brennan contrasted this with National League of Cities,
pointing out the state may still effectuate its goals to a certain degree, which must be tested
under a reasonable federal standard. Id.
38. Id. Justice Brennan pointed out that the Court in National League of Cities was
concerned not only with the effect of the regulatory scheme in that particular case, but also
with the state's potential inability to structure its operations and policy decisions. Id. See
426 U.S. at 849-50. That case emphasized the far-reaching impact which would be the con-
sequence of the application of the FLSA's wage and hour provisions to the states, which
would eventually impair their overall decision-making. Id. at 846-52.
39. 103 S. Ct. at 1063. Justice Brennan stated the financial effect in National League
of Cities was shown to be that by forcing the states to pay their workers a minimum wage
and overtime rate, it left the states with less money for other vital state programs. Id. at
1062-63.
40. Id. at 1063. See Hodel, 452 U.S. at 292 n.33; National League of Cities, 426 U.S. at
851-52.
41. 103 S. Ct. at 1063.
42. Id. Justice Brennan balanced these factors by pointing out that older workers will
not have to be paid out of pension funds while they continue working and will still be con-
tributing to the pension fund. Id. Additionally, when these older workers do retire, they will
not have to be paid benefits for as long as workers who retire earlier. Id. Furthermore, Jus-
tice Brennan observed the ADEA specifically provides that benefits received by older work-
ers do not have to be identical to those received by younger workers. Id. See 29 U.S.C. §
623(0(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The Court admitted that if benefits received by younger
workers were automatically identical to those received by older workers, the costs of benefits
would increase. 103 S. Ct. at 1063.
43. 103 S. Ct. at 1063-64. Justice Brennan pointed out that the appellees did not claim
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tion between this case and state policies which were infringed upon
in National League of Cities."
In conclusion, the Court held that Congress' extension of the
ADEA to state and local governments was a valid exercise of its
commerce clause powers, both facially and as applied in the pre-
sent case.40 The Court did not further decide if the ADEA is valid
under the fourteenth amendment. 46 Accordingly, the Court re-
versed and remanded the district court's decision. 47
In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens joined in the majority
opinion, but maintained that the underlying issues must be viewed
in a larger perspective. Justice Stevens first discussed the manner
in which the Court had construed the commerce clause and the
framers' intent in granting Congress this power.49 Justice Stevens
admitted that the commerce clause has been interpreted narrowly
at times by the Court,50 but maintained that the clause has evolved
with the nation to accomodate the growth of the nation's econ-
omy. 1 Accordingly, Justice Stevens pointed out, the Court has
overruled these earlier cases,' 2 and is once again in line with the
that there were any broader social or economic policies behind the retirement scheme, nor,
if there were, that they would reach the level of importance that is necessary under Na-
tional League of Cities. Id.
44. Id. One of the broader social or economic policies which Justice Brennan identified
from National League of Cities was the states' ability to offer jobs at below the minimum
wage to those who do not meet the minimum employment requirements. Id. See 426 U.S. at
848.
45. 103 S. Ct. at 1064. The Court observed that although the degree of federal intru-
sion in this case is not sufficient to strike down the ADEA's application to state govern-
ments under the third prong of the Hodel test, even if the third prong had been satisfied,
the nature of the federal interest in this case would possibly force the Court to find it justi-
fies state submission. Id. at 1064 n.17.
46. Id. at 1064. The Court did note, however, that when Congress exercises its powers
under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, in contrast to its commerce clause powers, Congress
is not subject to the same tenth amendment constraints. Id. at 1064 n.18. See infra note 83
and accompanying text.
47. 103 S. Ct. at 1064.
48. Id. at 1064-68 (Stevens, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 1064-65 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens maintained that the com-
merce clause was enacted for the very reasons that inspired the Constitution itself. Id. He
then quoted several passages from Justice Rutledge which support his premise that the rea-
son the nation was founded was to reduce trade restrictions, and the commerce clause was
the answer to this problem. See W. RUTLEDGE, A DECLARATION OF LEGAL FAITH 25-26 (1947).
50. See 103 S. Ct. at 1066 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
51. Id. at 1066. Justice Stevens observed that the Court's interpretation of the clause
has changed as our nation has evolved from a purely local, to a regional, to a national econ-
omy, until today where our economy is part of the international network. Id.




Justice Stevens observed that in enacting the ADEA, Congress
was exercising its power to regulate the labor market, which, in
order to be effective, must include not only the private, but also
the public sector." Justice Stevens conceded that Congress may
not violate another constitutional limitation when acting under its
commerce clause powers; however, he vehemently stated there was
no such applicable limitation in the present case.55 He further dis-
counted the limitation which the Court set forth in National
League of Cities,"6 and found no limitation on Congress' commerce
clause powers in the tenth amendment, 57 or any other constitu-
tional provision." In addition to believing that the Court improp-
erly decided National League of Cities, Justice Stevens advocated
a prompt reversal of that case, in spite of his belief of the doctrine
of stare decisis. 9
Justice Stevens concluded by emphasizing that his personal
views on the particular legislation in this case are irrelevant to his
conclusions." He noted the issue is not one of personal feelings
about a particular piece of legislation but instead one of constitu-
tional power: whether Congress may prescribe employment rela-
tions in both the- private and public sectors. 1 Justice Stevens
stated that in order for the national government to function effec-
tively, Congress must have this power."2
Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting opinion," maintained that
53. Id. at 1066. Justice Stevens again stated that the framers' intent was to give Con-
gress adequate power to enable it to function effectively. Id.
54. Id. at 1066-67 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens reasoned that the enor-
mous growth of the public sector has made it necessary for Congress to regulate both sectors
in order to be effective. Id.
55. Id. at 1067 (Stevens, J., concurring).
56. Id. Justice Stevens explained that the limitation which the Court placed on Con-
gress in National League of Cities was "pure judicial fiat." Id. See infra note 129 and ac-
companying text.
57. 103 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., concurring). See supra note 17.
58. 103 S. Ct. at 1067 (Stevens, J., concurring).
59. Id. Justice Stevens stated that since the central purpose of the Constitution itself
conflicts with the doctrine set forth in National League of Cities, that case does not deserve
the usual deference which is paid to the Court's decisions. Id.
60. Id. at 1068 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens pointed out that he believes
the burdens of the ADEA will outweigh the benefits. Id. He also did not believe the legisla-
tion in National League of Cities was beneficial, as he stated in his dissent in that case. Id.
He stated, however, that these inquiries are outside the realm of judicial decisions. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor joined in
the Chief Justice's dissent.
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the ADEA was unconstitutional as applied to the states and thus,
he would uphold the district court's ruling." Chief Justice Burger
found no constitutional provision, nor any judicial holding, which
grants to Congress the power to govern the states in making em-
ployment decisions. e5
Chief Justice Burger first discussed the rationale of the com-
merce clause," eventually focusing on the tenth amendment as a
restraint on Congress' power under the commerce clause.7 He then
enumerated the Hodel three pronged test, which the Court has
adopted in determining whether a particular piece of legislation
runs afoul of the tenth amendment."
Focusing on the second prong of the test, Chief Justice Burger
maintained the ADEA does address matters that are "attributes of
state sovereignty."' 9 He noted that parks and recreation must
surely be an attribute of state sovereignty, since it was specifically
identified in National League of Cities as a traditional state activ-
ity protected by the tenth amendment.7 0 He also pointed out that
when examining whether a particular piece of legislation addresses
an attribute of state sovereignty, it is helpful to determine whether
other states have enacted similar legislation.7 ' Chief Justice Burger
emphasized that Congress, in extending the ADEA to the federal
government, specifically exempted many classes of federal employ-
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1068-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). He first discussed the commerce clause,
because, as he maintained, it was this power upon which Congress expressly relied in enact-
ing the ADEA. Id. at 1068 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 1068-69 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger noted three cases in
recent years in which the court has considered Congress' commerce clause powers. Id. See
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982); Hodel, 452 U.S. 264 (1981);
National League of Cities, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 103 S. Ct. at 1068-69 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
68. 103 S. Ct. at 1069 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See supra notes 23-27 and accompa-
nying text.
69. 103 S. Ct. at 1069 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting National League of Cities,
426 U.S. at 845). Chief Justice Burger did not discuss the first prong of the Hodel test, since
he felt there was no dispute as to whether the ADEA is aimed at regulating the states as
states. Id. He noted that Congress specifically extended the provisions of the ADEA to state
and local governments at Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (1974) (current version
at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). 103 S. Ct. at 1069 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. 103 S. Ct. at 1069 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See National League of Cities, 426
U.S. at 851, where the Court stated that parks and recreation was an area where the state
traditionally has had control.
71. 103 S. Ct. at 1069 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger stated that more
than one half of the states had enacted mandatory retirement laws similar to Wyoming's
law. See id. at 1069-70 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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ees, such as law enforcement officers, from the coverage of the
Act.72 He thus concluded that the ADEA, by defining qualifications
of state employees, addresses an essential area of state
sovereignty. 3
In discussing the third prong of the test, whether the ADEA im-
pairs the state's ability to structure integral operations, Chief Jus-
tice Burger focused on both the economic and non-economic hard-
ships that are imposed upon the states by the enforcement of the
ADEA. 7" He pointed out several economic hardships which will re-
sult if the ADEA is applied to the states, such as increased em-




Chief Justice Burger did not believe that the hardships the
ADEA imposes upon the states are eased by any of the exceptions
to the Act." He further maintained that Congress, by permitting
mandatory early retirement "where age is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
particular business, 1 8 has not provided a practical solution to the
problem.7 9 Chief Justice Burger then concluded that the excep-
72. Id. at 1069-70 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger noted that although
Congress extended the ADEA to apply to the national government, the Act also provides
that "[rleasonable exemptions to the provisions of this section may be established by the
[Civil Service] Commission . . ." See Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(b)(2), 88 Stat. 74 (1974)
(current version at 29 U.S.C. § 633(a)(b)(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). 103 S. Ct. at 1069-70
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
73. 103 S. Ct. at 1070 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1070-72 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 1070 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Among the several increased employment
costs which Chief Justice Burger determined will result from the application of the ADEA
are increased pension costs, higher wages of workers with more years, higher insurance costs,
and increased disability costs of older workers. Id.
76. Id. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the
workers who are the most physically capable of doing a job are not the ones who will be
employed under the ADEA. Also, the incentive for promotions will be hindered since older
workers will remain on the job longer, thus impeding the advancement opportunities of
younger workers. Id.
77. Id. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which provides that an em-
ployer may "observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan such as retirement,
pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter."
Id. Chief Justice Burger contended that to fit within this exception to the Act, the states
will be forced to enact new laws which will also be an increased employment cost to the
states. 103 S. Ct. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
78. 103 S. Ct. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
79. 103 S. Ct. at 1071 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger noted that while
this exception may appear to ease the burden on the state of evaluating each employee
individually, the standards the courts have set for what constitutes a bona fide occupational
10031984
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tions to the ADEA do not constitute an alternative method which
still allows the states to structure their integral government
operations.8"
After concluding that the ADEA violates all three prongs of the
test, Chief Justice Burger then addressed the balancing test which
was introduced by Justice Blackmun in National League of Cities
and continued in Hodel.81 He nevertheless concluded that under
the commerce clause, Congress' powers are inadequate to prevent
the states from making their employment decisions when such de-
cisions are made in a rational manner.82
Chief Justice Burger then turned to a discussion of the ADEA
under Congress' powers under section five of the fourteenth
amendment, which enables Congress to enact legislation under its
equal protection powers.83 He noted that although Congress' pow-
ers are more expansive under this section of the Constitution than
under the commerce clause, Congress still may not act with total
abandon.84 Congress may only act under the fourteenth amend-
ment when there is an existing violation and Chief Justice Burger
reasoned that no such violation existed in this case, whether com-
mitted by the Court or Congress.85 He thus concluded that Con-
qualification have been so high that it does not, in fact, ease the burden. Id. In support, he
cited Arrit v. Grissell, 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977); Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours,
Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976); Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287,
1299 (D. Md. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 944 (1982). 103 S. Ct. at 1071-72 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
80. 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
81. Id. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
82. 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger noted that the
EEOC argued that the federal interest in preventing arbitrary discrimination, protecting the
social security system, and in establishing a free flow of commerce outweighed the state's
interest in its decision to be arbitrary. Id. Chief Justice Burger did not feel, however, the
state was merely asserting its sovereign right to be arbitrary. Id. Instead, he felt the state
was setting standards to meet local needs. Id. Hence, Chief Justice Burger maintained that
the state's interest in protecting its environment and citizens outweighs the federal interest.
Id.
83. Id. at 1072-75 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
84. 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger conceded that
under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment, Congress may enact legislation affecting the states,
however, the tenth amendment was not repealed when the fourteenth amendment was en-
acted. Id. He stated the inquiry must be made whether the fourteenth amendment permits
Congress to take from the states certain local decision making powers. Id.
85. Id. at 1073 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger pointed out that the
Court has twice considered whether mandatory retirement policies violate the fourteenth
amendment, in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) and Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), and it was decided in both instances, under a rational basis




gress in extending the ADEA to the states did not act pursuant to
Court-defined fourteenth amendment guarantees.8 6 Chief Justice
Burger failed to find that Congress attempted to define constitu-
tional law independently of the Court-defined law, in extending
the ADEA.8 7 He also pointed out that even assuming Congress did
have this power, he would still reject it in this case in light of the
federal mandatory retirement schemes which Congress passed for
federal law enforcement officers and firefighters 8 in the very same
year that they extended the ADEA to the states.89
Chief Justice Burger concluded that Congress does not have the
power, under the Constitution or any of its amendments, to substi-
tute its judgment for that of the states to select the states' employ-
ees.90 He reasoned that Congress was not given this power since it
lacks the basis for making informed decisions into local matters,
for the very reason that these decisions are better left to local gov-
ernment.91 Additionally, even if Congress were able to make well
informed decisions, he asserted, a uniform rule made applicable to
all of the states, not taking into account the diversity of the states,
would cause the states to lose their flexibility.92 He observed that
with no flexibility, the states will not only be unable to find the
best solution to their own problems, but they also will not have the
benefit of learning from the experiences of other states.9 3 Chief
Justice Burger concluded that it was not the framers' intent to
have each state identical, with no concern for local diversity.9
Justice Powell, in another dissenting opinion,95 began by re-
86. 103 S. Ct. at 1073 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 1073-74 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger stated he does not
believe that Congress has the power to substitute its own judgment for that of the Court's,
but even if he did concede Congress could do that, he did not find that that is what Con-
gress did in this case. Id.
88. Id. at 1074 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). See Pub. L. No. 93-350, § 4, 88 Stat. 356
(current version at 5 U.S.C. § 8335(b) (1982)).
89. 103 S. Ct. at 1074 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 1075 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
91. Id. Chief Justice Burger listed several factors which bear on well informed deci-
sion-making such as diversity of occupational risks, climate, geography and demography. Id.
92. Id. Chief Justice Burger contrasted the state of Wyoming, which is large with
sparsely populated areas and requires its law enforcers to be substantially more physically
capable, with that of Rhode Island, which is smaller with no wilderness. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell, who was also joined by Justice
O'Connor, wrote a separate dissenting opinion "to record a personal dissent from Justice
Stevens' novel view of our Nation's history." Id.
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counting Justice Stevens' view of our nation's history.9s Justice
Powell disagreed with Justice Stevens' view of the central purpose
of the Constitution, and instead proposed that the framers' intent
in writing the commerce clause is of minor significance in today's
world.97
Justice Powell discussed the Constitution itself, pointing to the
provisions he contended were of greatest importance, 98 and judged
the commerce clause to be of no great significance.9s He further
maintained that if the central mission of the constitutional conven-
tion had been the enactment of the commerce clause, the Constitu-
tion would never have been ratified. 00
Justice Powell then discussed the tenth amendment as an ex-
press limitation on the national government. 10 1 He explained that
the concepts of federalism' 01 and state sovereignty have always
been prevalent and an important part of our nation's political his-
tory.10 He illustrated this point with several decisions which the
Court has handed down in its most recent Term which express the
state sovereignty principle.'"s
96. Id. at 1075-76 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell specifically quoted from Jus-
tice Stevens' opinion concerning the framers' intent and the central purpose of the Consti-
tution, with respect to the commerce clause. Id.
97. Id. at 1076 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell maintained that the central pur-
pose of the constitutional convention was to create a national government within a federal
system, although he admits the commerce clause was possibly a minor concern. Id.
98. Id. at 1076-77 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell considered the first three
articles of the Constitution which establish the government and the system of checks and
balances to be of greatest importance; he also noted that the central purpose of the Consti-
tution is that which is set out in the preamble to the Constitution. Id.
99. Id. at 1077 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell observed the position of the
commerce clause in the Constitution in art. I, § 8, and pointed out that although it was
given a position of prominence, it was merely one of a long list of powers which Congress
was given. Id.
1OO. Id.
101. Id. at 1078 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell stated that the tenth amend-
ment was not even necessary since the concept of reserved powers in the states was clear
from the Constitution itself and the structure of the federal government. Id.
102. Id. at 1078-80 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell cited many pre-civil war
instances which exemplify the concept of federalism in the south. Id. at 1078-79 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). See 4 J. ELLioT, DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CoNsTrrurioN, 528-29 (2d ed. 1863);
THE WORKS OF JOHN C. CALHOUN, 1-57 (R. Cralle ed. 1859). He also premised this view on
various instances which were not solely limited to the south, but also included the New
England states. 103 S. Ct. at 1079-80. (Powell, J., dissenting).
103. 103 S. Ct. at 1080 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell admitted that although
the concept of state sovereignty has changed over time, it has nevertheless been continually
recognized. Id.
104. Id. Justice Powell pointed to the following cases: Federal Energy Regulatory
Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (deciding whether the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act was an invasion of state sovereignty); United Transp. Union v. Long Island
1006
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Justice Powell concluded that all of these factors lead to the con-
clusion that the principles of federalism have always been recog-
nized as an important part of our government, with the reserved
powers of the states limiting Congress' powers under the commerce
clause.10 5 Finally, Justice Powell expressed his view that under
Justice Stevens' concept of the commerce clause and its impor-
tance over state sovereignty, there would be no state function
"however sovereign-that could not be preempted. '"lo
The commerce clause power of Congress has long been recog-
nized by the Court as broad, although not without limits. 10 7 In Na-
tional League of Cities v. Usery,10 8 the Court held, for the first
time since 1936,109 that a congressional enactment under the com-
merce clause power unconstitutionally infringed upon state sover-
eignty.110 This is not to say this conflict has never been debated by
the Court; to the contrary, for many years prior to National
League of Cities, the Court has juggled this issue.1 '
In Coyle v. Smith,"'2 a 1911 decision, the Court held that a con-
gressional enactment was an unconstitutional usurpation of state
sovereignty. 13 Again in 1936, in United States v. California,"4 the
R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982) (applying the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railway); Com-
munity Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 445 U.S. 40 (1982) (addressing the state
action exemption from the antitrust laws). 103 S. Ct. at 1080 (Powell, J., dissenting).
105. 103 S. Ct. at 1080-81 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell still considered the
commerce clause to be vital to our national government, but only as one provision in our
federal system. Id. at 1081 n.13 (Powell, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1081 (Powell, J., dissenting).
107. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), in discussing the commerce
power of Congress, Chief Justice Marshall stated: "It is the power to regulate; that is, to
prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in
Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no
limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Id. at 196.
108. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
109. The last such holding was in Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936). See gen-
erally, Comment, Redefining the National League of Cities State Sovereignty Doctrine,
129 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1460, 1463-69 (1981); Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National
Economy, 1933-1946 Part Two, 59 HAuv. L. Rzv. 883, 946 (1946).
110. 426 U.S. at 842. The Court has held that other constitutional amendments have
been violated by Congress' otherwise valid exercise of its commerce clause powers. See
Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969) (involving the due process clause of the fifth
amendment); United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (right to trial by jury which is
contained in the sixth amendment).
111. See infra notes 112-128 and accompanying text.
112. 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
113. Id. at 565-68. In Coyle, the federal statute involved was the Enabling Act, which
conditioned Oklahoma's admittance to the union upon its choice of its own local seat of
government, which the Court held was an unconstitutional infringement within "essentially
and peculiarly state powers." Id. at 565.
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Court inferred that there was some difference in congressional reg-
ulation of a state when it is engaged in sovereign functions, as op-
posed to when the state is acting as a private competitor, thus
leaving open the question of whether Congress may regulate the
states in areas of state sovereignty.115 The Court has also recog-
nized limitations on Congress' power to tax the state where the
activity under question involves an area of state sovereignty.
1 6
In Maryland v. Wirtz," 7 the Court took a strong stance in refus-
ing to recognize any limits on Congress' powers to regulate the
states, regardless of whether the activity involved was in an area of
state sovereignty." 8 Although the majority of the Court in Wirtz
found no limitations upon Congress' power, the issue of state sov-
ereignty was kept alive in a dissent by Justice Douglas, in which
114. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
115. Id. at 183-84. In United States v. California, Congress was regulating state-
owned railroads. Id. at 180. In National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist specifically
noted that the holding in United States v. California was consistent with the Court's hold-
ing, since the activity in United States v. California was not in an area of integral state
operations. 426 U.S. at 854 & n.18. While Justice Rehnquist believed the holding was consis-
tent with National League of Cities, he did point out that some of the language from
United States v. California, which was quoted in the National League of Cities opinion,
was inconsistent with the holding. Id.
116. In New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), the Court considered the
constitutionality of a federal tax on mineral water which was being sold by the State of New
York. In upholding the tax, the Court stated:
A state may, like a private individual, own real property and receive income. But in
view of our former decisions, we could hardly say that a general non-discriminatory
real estate tax (apportioned), or an income tax laid upon citizens and states alike
could be constitutionally applied to the State's capital, its statehouse, its public
school houses, public parks, or its revenues from taxes on school lands, even though
all real property and all income of the citizen is taxed.
Id. at 587-88.
Although in National League of Cities, Justice Rehnquist cited New York v. United
States as controlling, 426 U.S. at 843-44, Justice Brennan maintained that the Court based
its decision on the principle of implied immunity of the states and the federal government
from taxation by each other, not on Congress' restraints on its commerce clause powers by
virtue of state sovereignty. Id.at 863-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
117. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The issue was whether the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA), which imposed minimum wages and overtime pay requirements, could constitution-
ally be applied to schools and hospitals which were run by the state. Id. at 186-87.
118. Id. at 195-99. The Wirtz Court quoted the following language from the United
States v. California opinion which it felt was controlling:
We look to the activities in which the states have traditionally engaged as marking
the boundary of the restriction upon the federal taxing power. But there is no such
limitation upon the plenary power to regulate Commerce. The state can no more
deny the power if its exercise has been authorized by Congress than can an
individual.
Id. (quoting United States v. California, 297 U.S. at 184-85).
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Justice Stewart concurred."' Citing a long line of state sovereignty
cases,120 Justice Douglas concluded that if the sovereign power of
the state could be infringed upon to such a degree, "the National
Government could devour the essentials of state sovereignty,
though that sovereignty is attested by the Tenth Amendment." '
Seven years later, however, and only one year before National
League of Cities was decided, a majority of the Court recognized in
Fry v. United States'2" that the tenth amendment does limit Con-
gress in exercising its commerce clause powers.12 3 The Court up-
held the legislation in Fry as constitutional, 2 " but pointed out that
the tenth amendment is not without significance. 25 "The Amend-
ment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress
may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integ-
rity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.'
2
The Court held that the legislation involved in Fry was even less
intrusive than was the legislation in Wirtz, and balanced many fac-
tors in concluding the benefits of the federal legislation were signif-
icant. 27 It should be noted that Justice Rehnquist dissented in
Fry, one year before writing the majority opinion in National
League of Cities.2 8
In National League of Cities, the Court finally affirmed that
when acting under its commerce clause powers, Congress is pre-
cluded from infringing upon state and local governments in areas
of traditional state functions which impair the states' ability to
structure integral operations.' 29 The legislation involved was the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),3 0 which was amended in 1974
to apply to state and local governments, and imposed upon them
119. 392 U.S. at 201-05 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 204 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas cited Katzenbach v. McClung,
379 U.S. 294 (1964), New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946), Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926), and McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 392 U.S. at 204 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
121. 392 U.S. at 205 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
122. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
123. Id. at 547 n.7.
124. Id. at 548.
125. Id. at 547 n.7.
126. Id. at 547-48 & n.7. The Court still held that the legislation in this case did not
invade state sovereignty to an impermissible degree. Id. at 548.
127. Id. at 548.
128. See id. at 549 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
129. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
130. Id. at 835. See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
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maximum hour and minimum wage provisions."'
As noted, Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court,13 2 stated
the issue was not whether the FLSA was not within Congress' com-
merce clause powers, but whether it was constitutional as applied
to the states.13" The Court found that this legislation was within an
area of state sovereignty, 84 and then examined whether these deci-
sions which Congress has taken away from the states are "func-
tions essential to separate and independent existence."135 In mak-
ing this determination, Justice Rehnquist discussed the
economic' 6 and non-economic'37 hardships which the states will
suffer by their adherence to the FLSA.35 Justice Rehnquist then
concluded that the extension of the FLSA to the states is not
within Congress' power under the commerce clause, since it "di-
rectly displaced the states' freedom to structure integral operations
in areas of traditional governmental functions."'3 9 The Court also
expressly overruled Maryland v. Wirtz,14 0 but maintained that Fry
v. United States'4 1 was consistent with its present holding.
14 2
131. See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), 88
Stat. 55 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
132. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion; Justice Bren-
nan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices White and Marshall joined; Justice Stevens
filed a separate dissenting opinion.
133. Id. at 842.
134. Id. at 845. The Court maintained that determining minimum wages and maxi-
mum hours of the state's employees was unquestionably an attribute of state sovereignty,
although the Court gave no justification or reasoning for this conclusion. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 845-46. He noted the increased costs in essential police and fire protection,
citing the actual amounts several states had predicted their increases would be. Id. Justice
Rehnquist stated, "U]udged solely in terms of increased costs in dollars, the FLSA had a
significant impact on the functioning of the governmental bodies involved." Id. at 846.
137. Id. at 846-51. Non-economic hardships which the Court noted included curtail-
ment of affirmative action programs for women in law enforcement, loss of discretion in
hiring part-time employees and those with less than minimum employment requirements,
changes in overtime policies and changes in usage of volunteers in performing certain func-
tions. Id. Justice Rehnquist stated "quite apart from the substantial costs imposed upon the
states and their political subdivisions, the Act displaces state policies regarding the manner
in which they will structure delivery of those governmental services which their citizens
require." Id. at 847.
138. Id. at 845-51.
139. Id. at 852.
140. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The Court in Wirtz had held that there was no limitation on
Congress in regulating the state, even in areas of state sovereignty. Id. at 195. See supra
notes 117-121 and accompanying text. The Court in National League of Cities overruled
this since it held the states as states are to be treated differently than private individuals.
426 U.S. at 854.
141. 421 U.S. 541 (1975).
142. 426 U.S. at 852-53. The Court maintained that since the legislation in Fry was
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Justice Blackmun in a concurring opinion, while noting the mag-
nitude of the Court's decision, adopted a balancing approach be-
tween the state and federal governments. 43 Justice Brennan wrote
a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices White and Marshall,14 and
asserted a considerably stronger position than the position he took
in EEOC v. Wyoming.' 45 Justice Brennan maintained in National
League of Cities that the majority was merely unhappy with Con-
gress' judgment in extending the FLSA to the states. 46 After re-
counting a history of the cases which have evolved in this area,
Justice Brennan concluded: "I cannot recall another instance in
this Court's history when the reasoning of so many decisions cover-
ing so long of a span of time has been discarded in such a rough-
shod manner.' 47 Justice Brennan also observed that the decision
not only restructured the relationship between the federal govern-
ment and the states, but also the role of the federal judiciary, in
allowing the Court to disturb Congress' findings. 48 Justice Stevens
also dissented in National League of Cities, recognizing no limita-
tion upon Congress' power over the labor market, irrespective of
his personal views with regards to this particular legislation.'
49
Since National League of Cities, the Court has had several occa-
sions to reconsider the restriction placed upon Congress' commerce
clause power by the tenth amendment. 50 In Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Association,"' Justice Marshall
set out a three-pronged test for determining whether a federal reg-
ulation runs afoul of the tenth amendment. 1 2 The Court found
that the legislation 58 involved in Hodel did not meet the test be-
aimed to combat a national emergency and the legislation was narrowly drawn and didn't
substantially interfere with the states, it was not inconsistent with its holding. Id.
143. 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun joined the majority
opinion, but interpreted the majority's decision as allowing Congress to enact legislation in a
response to federal problems which outweigh the state interest in certain areas, such as
environmental protection. Id.
144. Id. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. See infra notes 158-165 and accompanying text.
146. 426 U.S. at 871-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 875-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan maintained that the only
role the Court should have in this matter should be to examine whether Congress made a
reasonable judgment into what is "commerce." Id. at 876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. See infra notes 151-167 and accompanying text.
151. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
152. Id. at 287-88. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
153. The legislation involved in Hodel was the steep-slope provisions of the Surface
Mining Control & Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1976 & Supp. III 1979),
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cause it did not regulate the states as states, but merely as private
individuals.'" The Hodel Court also noted that even if satisfying
each of the three prongs of the test does not insure that the regula-
tion will be struck down, there will be cases where the "nature of
the federal interest advanced may be such that it justifies state
submission."1 65
Since Hodel, the Court has applied the three-pronged test to
federal regulations, but the Court has never held that Congress has
exceeded its commerce clause power because of tenth amendment
constraints. 156 Hodel, however, has kept alive the principles of Na-
tional League of Cities, and although no legislation has been found
to violate this doctrine, the Court has left open the door for such a
finding to be made. EEOC v. Wyoming did not prove to be the





The Court in EEOC v. Wyoming had before it the opportunity
either to reverse the district court's decision and overrule the prin-
ciples which had been set forth in National League of Cities, or by
affirming the decision, recognize National League of Cities as a
firm limitation on Congress' power under the commerce clause,
thus clarifying that decision's importance. The Court chose neither
of these alternatives, however, and instead adopted a compromised
position. The Court recognized National League of Cities as con-
trolling, but distinguished EEOC v. Wyoming on a factual basis.1"
which required the states to submit a regulatory program to be adopted by each state which
meets the federal minimum standards, or by adoption of a federal program for any state
which chose not to submit a program. 452 U.S. at 288.
154. 452 U.S. at 288. The provisions of the legislation governed only the activities of
private coal mine operators. Id.
155. Id. at 288 n.29. Justice Marshall seems to have adopted the balancing test set
forth by Justice Blackmun in National League of Cities. See 426 U.S. at 852-53 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
156. In United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), the Court held
the application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railway did not interfere with the
state's ability to structure integral operations, nor was it a traditional state function. Id. at
685-86. See also FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) in which the Court upheld the
challenged provision, the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L.
No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978), as not violating the Hodel test. Id.
157. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). See Kilpatrick, Three Cheers For The 10th Amendment,
Pittsburgh Press, Oct. 22, 1982, at B-2, col. 3, where Mr. Kilpatrick predicted the Court
would have to either overturn National League of Cities or affirm the district court's opin-
ion in EEOC v. Wyoming.
158. 103 S. Ct. 1053 (1983), Justice Brennan set forth in his opinion the rulings which
had emerged from National League of Cities and Hodel, but found that the ADEA, unlike
the FLSA did not "directly impair" the State's ability to "structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental operations." Id. at 1062. See generally supra notes 20-50
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Justice Brennan, in giving such deference to National League of
Cities and conceding it to be controlling in EEOC v. Wyoming has
changed his position significantly on the state sovereignty issue
since his dissent in National League of Cities.159 Justice Stevens,
on the other hand, has consistently held to his belief that regard-
less of the wisdom of the particular piece of legislation which is
involved, the federal government has the power to regulate the la-
bor market in the private as well as public sectors.16 0
The dissenters in EEOC v. Wyoming also remained consistent
with their majority opinion in National League of Cities, in hold-
ing both the FLSA and the ADEA unconstitutional as applied to
the states.161 Justice Blackmun proved to be the crucial vote in up-
holding the legislation, unlike his position in National League of
Cities, where he struck down Congress' attempt to extend the
FLSA to the states."es The determining factor that led Justice
Blackmun to strike down the FLSA in National League of Cities
and uphold the ADEA in EEOC v. Wyoming is difficult to iden-
tify. 16 By recognizing National League of Cities as controlling,
and distinguishing EEOC v. Wyoming on factual considerations,
Justice Brennan was possibly able to include Justice Blackmun in
and accompanying text.
159. In his dissent in National League of Cities, Justice Brennan took a firm position
in stating- "[M]y Brethren do not successfully obscure today's patent usurpation of the role
reserved for the political process by their purported discovery in the Constitution of a re-
straint derived from sovereignty of the States on Congress' exercise of the commerce
power." 426 U.S. at 858. (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also asserted "[t]here is no restraint
based on state sovereignty requiring or permitting judicial enforcement anywhere expressed
in the Constitution; our decisions over the last century and a half have explicitly rejected
the existence of any such restraint on the commerce power." Id. See supra notes 144-148
and accompanying text.
160. In National League of Cities, Justice Stevens dissented, believing the FLSA was
constitutionally valid. 426 U.S. at 881. (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 149 and
accompanying text. In EEOC v. Wyoming, after an in depth discussion of the commerce
clause and state sovereignty, Justice Stevens again found no limitation on Congress' com-
merce clause powers in the tenth amendment, nor any other constitutional provision. He
also expressed his belief that National League of Cities was improperly decided and should
be reversed. 103 S. Ct. at 1064-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra notes 48-62 and ac-
companying text.
161. In National League of Cities, the majority was comprised of Chief Justice Bur-
ger, Justices Stewart, Powell and Rehnquist, with Justice Blackmun concurring. 426 U.S.
833. In EEOC v. Wyoming, Chief Justice Burger, Justices Powell, Rehnquist and O'Connor
dissented. 103 S. Ct at 1068 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). So except for the exchange of Justice
Stewart for Justice O'Connor, and Justice Blackmun switching his position, the majority in
National League of Cities was comprised of the dissenters in EEOC v. Wyoming.
162. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
163. Justice Blackmun did not write a separate opinion, but merely joined in the ma-
jority opinion in EEOC v. Wyoming.
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the majority, while sacrificing his earlier convictions. 164
While the Court in EEOC v. Wyoming distinguished the case on
a factual basis from National League of Cities, it is difficult to
perceive that these differences are, as Justice Brennan stated, "suf-
ficiently less serious than [they were] in National League of Cities
so as to make it unnecessary for us to override Congress' express
choice to extend its regulatory authority to the states.1 ' 65 While an
in-depth discussion of the differences in the financial effects of the
FLSA and the ADEA on the states' ability to structure integral
operations is beyond the scope of this analysis, " looking to the
non-economic hardships, it is difficult to perceive what the differ-
ences are between the effects of the two acts. 6 ' In his dissent in
EEOC v. Wyoming, Chief Justice Burger maintained that the non-
economic hardships were critical, pointing to several factors,' "
which seem comparable to those noted by Justice Rehnquist in
National League of Cities.69
By overruling the district court decision in EEOC v. Wyoming
and distinguishing it on a factual basis from National League of
Cities, the Court has left the tenth amendment state sovereignty
doctrine in limbo. It may appear that no case shall arise which will
overturn Congress' decision to extend a particular piece of legisla-
tion to the states. By recognizing and reaffirming the principles
which the Court set forth in National League of Cities but distin-
guishing EEOC v. Wyoming on a factual basis, the Court has given
itself the opportunity to eventually strike down a federal regula-
164. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
165. 103 S. Ct. at 1062.
166. Justice Brennan concluded that the increased costs of the ADEA will be offset by
many other factors. 103 S. Ct. at 1062-63. See supra notes 30-44 and accompanying text.
For a contrary view, see Comment, The Unconstitutionality of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 17 TULSA L.J. 782 (1982).
167. Justice Brennan maintained that in National League of Cities, the Court was
concerned with the states' "ability to use their employment relationship with their citizens
as a tool for pursuing social and economic policies beyond their immediate managerial
goals." 103 S. Ct. at 1063-64. See 426 U.S. at 848. In EEOC v. Wyoming, Justice Brennan
stated there had been no such similar claim, and even if there had been, it would not have
been of the same magnitude as was the case in National League of Cities. 103 S. Ct. at 1064.
168. See supra note 76.
169. In National League of Cities, the effect of the FLSA on the states was shown by
Justice Rehnquist to have forced the states to reduce the training time of highway patrol-
men, which would in turn effect the safety and welfare of state highways. 426 U.S. at 846-47.
In EEOC v. Wyoming, Chief Justice Burger pointed out "that a fire may burn out of control
because the firefighters are not physically able to cope, or a criminal may escape because a
law-enforcement officer's reflexes are too slow to react swiftly enough to apprehend an of-
fender .... " 103 S. Ct. at 1072 (Burger, C.J. dissenting).
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tion, although it is difficult to conceive that the present Court
would do so, unless Justice Blackmun once again changes his
position.
The 5-4 decision in EEOC v. Wyoming, while keeping the state
sovereignty principle alive, makes any prediction of the future of
this doctrine mere speculation in light of the likelihood that the
composition of the Court may soon change. As it stands now, the
Court has overruled the district court's decision in EEOC v. Wyo-
ming, which had appeared to intrude upon state sovereignty to a
larger degree than any past cases which the Court has considered
since National League of Cities.17 0 Although with this decision the
Court has firmly entrenched the state sovereignty doctrine in our
constitutional law, it seems the doctrine has once again taken a
position similar to the pre-National League of Cities era. 
71
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170. Post-National League of Cities and pre-EEOC v. Wyoming cases were more eas-
ily decided by the Court. See supra notes 150-157 and accompanying text.
171. Before the Coart decided National League of Cities, the state sovereignty issue
had been raised, but usually in dissents, and not since 1936 had a federal regulation been
struck down as not within Congress' commerce clause powers. See supra notes 107-128.
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